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Prelude: What are Indexicals?
The term indexical is used in many ways in the literature. On its most inclusive use, the term seems 
to pick out any kind of linguistic expression the content of which depends on the situation,  or 
context, in which it is used. On this broad construal all the following expressions are indexicals:
I, you, he, we, then, yesterday, now, here, over there, that, this, local 
(as in John went to a local bar), every bottle, all the students, strong 
(as in Steal isn't strong enough), the table, and many others.
This list consists of expressions that are otherwise very different. I, you, he, we are pronouns, here,  
now, yesterday adverbs, every bottle a quantifier phrase etc. It is therefore highly likely that we will 
find that these expressions require quite different treatment. Hence, if we want the term indexical to 
have any substantive utility, we will need to constrain it considerably.
The most common way of doing so seems to be to construe indexicals as essentially rule-
governed in the way they refer on an occasion of use. So, the category of indexicals, on this picture, 
may  cut  across  different  parts  of  speech  such  as  pronouns,  adverbs,  quantifier  expressions, 
predicates etc. For instance, one might think that a pronoun like I and a predicate like strong share 
the common feature that their content on an occasion of use – a person in the case of the pronoun, 
and  a  set  in  the  case  of  the  predicate  –  is  determined  by  certain  rules  associated  with  the 
expressions. Both would therefore warrant the label indexical. Given this, whether or not some kind 
of expression is indexical or not depends on one's theory of how that kind of expression works in 
context.
Traditionally,  however,  theorists  usually  thought  of  indexicals  as  context-sensitive 
referential expressions. This narrows the field in that (at least) predicates like strong, adverbs like 
local and quantifier phrases such as every bottle (and perhaps incomplete definite descriptions such 
as the table) are ruled out. So on this picture, indexicals are first and foremost pronouns such as I,  
you, he, that and this, and adverbs such as now, here and yesterday.
The reason for this traditional way of carving the space seems precisely to be that most 
theorists would seem to agree that the way in which these expressions refer on a particular occasion 
of use is governed by rules, although the precise nature of these rules is highly contested, as is 
indeed the question of whether they should be regarded as rules of language, whatever that means.
The fundamental puzzle about indexicals, then, is  how is this context-dependent reference 
achieved. Are there, for instance, linguistic rules which determine what an indexical refers to? Or 
are their reference perhaps more a matter of some kind of tacit negotiation between speaker and 
hearer? Or perhaps their reference just depends on what the speaker meant or intended?
All of these questions have deep consequences not only for the philosophy of language, but 
also for issues in philosophy of mind and epistemology. Indexicality is at the heart of the way we 
think  and  talk,  and  it  is  a  well-documented  fact  that  indexicality  seems,  moreover,  to  be 
indispensable. It has long been acknowledged that, given our cognitive limitations, it is impossible 
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to do away with indexicality. The phenomenon, therefore, cannot be relegated as a mere matter of a 
convenient way of facilitating communication; and by the same token, it requires more than just 
linguistic investigation. Philosophical problems arise and require philosophical solutions. This does 
not mean, however, that we should not recognize that indexicality is first and foremost a linguistic 
phenomenon, and the starting point of any kind of investigation of it, philosophical or otherwise, 
must therefore proceed from thorough examination of the role it plays in the way we use language 
to communicate with each other.
Abstract
The paper objects to the treatment of descriptive uses of indexicals proposed by Nunberg (1993). It 
is shown that the arguments Nunberg presents are ineffective against a pragmatic account of these 
uses such as that put forth by Recanati (1993). The conclusion is that there are good reasons to 
believe  that  the  deferred  interpretation  in  question  are  generated  by  non-semantic  processes 
involving extralinguistic factors such as the speaker's communicative intentions.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with some problems surrounding the interpretation of utterances containing 
indexical expressions. (I will often refer to such utterances as `indexical utterances'.) In particular, 
the aim of the paper is  to  object  to two arguments put forth  by Nunberg (1993) regarding the 
interpretation of so-called descriptive uses of indexicals.
Nunberg presents a detailed and powerful theory of indexicality which he puts forth as an 
alternative to what he takes to be the inadequate standard view, namely the direct reference theory 
of indexicals. A version of the direct reference theory is endorsed by Recanati (1993) who directly 
engages with Nunberg's objections. In this paper, I will focus on Nunberg's objections, and I will 
not be concerned with the details of the direct reference theory. My aim is to show that Nunberg's 
two  main  arguments  against  the  way  the  proponent  of  the  direct  reference  theory  handles 
descriptive uses of indexicals both fail.
Section  2  introduces  the  problem we are  concerned  with.  Section  3  presents  Nunberg's 
theory of indexicality. Section 4 objects to Nunberg's arguments. Section 5 attempts to draw some 
conclusions about the nature of utterance interpretation.
2 The Problem of Interpretation
One central problem of interpretation and indexicality is this: How do hearers
arrive at the contents they do arrive at by interpreting utterances containing
indexicals?
Let us take a somewhat naive perspective and think of things according to the following 
picture. An utterer produces a token of an English sentences containing an indexical expression. A 
hearer intercepts this token. What we are calling `interpretation' is the process, whatever it is, by 
which the hearer is lead from this interception to a state in which she entertains a certain content as 
a result of taking as input to the process the token produced by the utterer.
When the hearer has done this without erring along the way we are inclined to say that she 
has  understood the utterance. In our everyday practices, we are often prepared to use locutions 
involving the verb  say to describe something like the feature of utterances which is the target of 
hearers' interpretative processes; for instance, we have a practice of using notions such as what is  
said, what the speaker says, what the speaker means to say and so on.
As  this  suggests,  we  are  prepared  to  distinguish  between  what  is  (literally)  said  by an 
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utterance and what a speaker means to say or communicate with an utterance. Correspondingly, we 
have at our disposal two intuitive notions of utterance understanding. That is, we can distinguish 
between understanding what is literally said and understanding what is meant by an utterance. To 
see this, we can note that it is possible to misunderstand what is meant while understanding what is 
said; and conversely it is possible to misunderstand what is said while understanding what is meant.
To illustrate, suppose Prof. X is the reader of the infamous student reference containing (1).
(1) This student is punctual and has excellent handwriting.
Suppose further that Prof. X were to interpret the utterance thereby made in such a way that the 
output content was simply that the student in question is punctual and has excellent handwriting. In 
this kind of case, normal practice does not hesitate in passing judgements like, “Sure, that was what 
the  referee  literally  said  in  the  letter,  but  Prof.  X  nevertheless  still  misunderstood;  she  didn't 
understand what the referee meant to say."
The reverse case is perhaps harder to construct. But it is perfectly possible to imagine that 
there could be a situation in which, for whatever reason, Prof. X interprets the utterance involving 
(1) such that on the one hand she takes handwriting to mean cooking skill; but on the other hand, 
she still takes the speaker to have intended to communicate the content that the student in question 
is not a good student. (Indeed, she might think that having excellent cooking skill is irrelevant for 
being a good student.)
This  was  Grice's  (1989)  point.  At  least  at  this  level  of  analysis,  we  need  a  clear-cut 
distinction between the two types of content which we normally refer to by `what is said' and `what 
is meant', respectively. There is certainly no doubt that the way we talk about utterances outside our 
theorising makes such a distinction. It is natural to predict, then, that our theories will likewise need
both notions to account for the phenomenon of utterance interpretation.
2.1 What kinds of Propositions can be meant by Utterances containing Indexicals?
A related question to the one we identified – how hearers get to understand indexical utterances – is 
the following: How comprehensive is the range of contents communicated by means of indexical 
utterances?  In  particular,  availing  ourselves  of  an  established  terminology of  propositions,  the 
question is: Are indexical utterances used to communicate only singular propositions, or are they 
also  used  to  communicate  general  propositions?  Roughly speaking,  a  singular  proposition  is  a 
structured  entity which contains  an individual  in  the place  corresponding to  the  subject  of  the 
sentence which is said to express it. By contrast, a general proposition is a structured entity which 
contains a property or a relation in the place corresponding to the subject of the sentence which is 
said to express it.
The answer to the present question seems at first hand straightforward. It seems to be an 
empirical datum that utterances containing indexicals are sometimes used to communicate general 
propositions.  That is,  there are cases in which,  in order to count as understanding an indexical 
utterance, on one notion of understanding, it is required that the hearer arrive at a content which
involves a property rather than an object. An example from Nunberg is (2).
(2) Uttered by a condemned prisoner: I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I want for 
my last meal.
Ordinary judgement does not hesitate in judging that a hearer who interprets the utterance in (2) 
such that the output of her interpretative process is the singular proposition involving the utterer 
misunderstands the utterance. Correct understanding, then, seems to require arriving at something 
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like a general proposition involving the property of being a condemned prisoner. Hence, it seems 
that an indexical utterance like the one in (2) can be used to communicate general propositions. (We 
return to the details of this case below.) In such a case, the indexical is said to be used descriptively.
The problem is whether this general content is arrived at by a process which, somewhere 
along the way,  involves a literal  content – in this  case a singular content involving the utterer. 
Recanati thinks that is does; Nunberg thinks not.
Nunberg's paper presents an abundance of examples like (2) where it seems that an indexical 
utterance is used to communicate a general rather than a singular proposition. Recanati agrees that 
this conclusion is correct, but only for some of Nunberg's cases. Regarding these, Recanati holds a 
view according to which the general proposition is arrived at by a two-step interpretative process 
with a base level of literal meaning acting as input, the output being a level of non-literal, deferred 
content. As he says,
It  is  true  that  both  indexicals  and  descriptions  can  be  used  either  referentially  or  
descriptively. [...] Yet, at the basic level, indexicals must be given a de re interpretation, 
contrary to definite descriptions. (Recanati (1993, 314))
By contrast, for reasons we shall consider in detail, Nunberg argues that these descriptive uses of 
indexicals do not render themselves to the two-fold treatment.
We should mention a caveat about Recanati's  framework before moving on.  Recanati  is 
explicit that he holds a view according to which
the distinction between basic level interpretations and other, non-basic interpretations does 
not correspond to that between what is literally expressed (what is said) and what is merely 
`conveyed'.  Non-basic  interpretations  such  as  those  involved  in  Nunberg's  examples  of 
deferred reference themselves constitute `what is said' by the utterances which give rise to 
these interpretations. (Recanati (1993, 316))
So, why are we justified in following Nunberg in taking Recanati's position to be one where the 
basic level of interpretation – i.e.  the level where I in (2) makes singular reference – is a level of 
literal meaning, the descriptive reading arising at the next level by a pragmatic process?
The reason has to do with the way Recanati uses the term `pragmatic'. The crucial point is 
that although the basic level is reached via pragmatic processes applied directly to the sentence 
meaning composed out of the linguistic meaning of the terms, the basic level is defined by Recanati 
as  “the  level  of  interpretation  which  is  reached  when  no  optional  p-processes  [i.e.  pragmatic 
processes] occurs." (315) In other words, the basic level is reached solely by mandatory processes. 
By contrast, the next level – i.e. the level to which I in (2) contributes a property – is arrived at by 
optional pragmatic processes.
In  other  words,  the  difference  between  Recanati's  view  and  the  view  we,  along  with 
Nunberg, are attributing to him which takes the general readings of descriptively used indexicals as 
arrived at by implicature is merely a terminological difference. The important point is that Recanati 
holds that the pragmatic process by which we arrive at the general content involving the property of 
being a condemned prisoner by interpreting (2) is optional, whereas the process by which we arrive 
at the basic level, which is required for the next level, is mandatory.
I  therefore  take  Nunberg  to  be  correct  in  the  relevant  respects  when  he  summarises 
Recanati's view as follows:
On Recanati's view, there is a coherent level at which indexicals like I can be
given a “literal" interpretation where they refer directly, with their descriptive
readings arising as a kind of implicature. (§4)
As we shall see, one of Nunberg's main arguments against this view is exactly that he thinks that 
such a putative basic level may involve contents which are incoherent.
3 Nunberg's Theory of Indexicality
In presenting Nunberg's theory I will focus on two aspects, which I take to be the most central. The 
first is a distinction Nunberg proposes to account for the meaning of indexicals. The second is his 
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view of the difference between referential terms such as indexicals and non-referential terms such 
as descriptions.
3.1 The Index-Referent Distinction
A central  device of  Nunberg's  theory is  a  distinction  between what  he  calls  the  index and the 
referent of an indexical.  The former corresponds to what would traditionally be taken to be the 
contextually identified referent, i.e. roughly the value of the Kaplanian character associated with the 
term in question (where the context of utterance is the argument of the function). In other words, the
index of I is the utterer, the index of you is the addressee and the the index of tomorrow is the day 
after  the utterance.  Nunberg reserves the term `referent'  to what is  contributed to the output of 
interpretation.
One central purpose of Nunberg's examples, we can now see, is to show that the thesis that 
the index and the referent of an indexical are always identical,  which Nunberg attributes to the 
proponent  of  the  direct  reference theory,  is  false.  For  instance,  with  respect  to  the  condemned 
prisoner case, Jesse James serves as the index whereas the property of being a condemned prisoner 
is the referent.
The immediate question now becomes: What is the relation between index and referent? A 
perhaps natural  view is  to hold that the referent is obtained from the index by means of some 
pragmatic process. Thus, one might hold that the prisoner case should be accounted for by appeal to 
a distinction of the kind we sketched above, namely between literal meaning, what is said, and a 
content which is arrived at by pragmatic processes involving, among other things, the speaker's 
communicative intentions. As we have seen, Recanati opts for a picture essentially like this.
However,  Nunberg denies  that  the cases of  descriptive readings  of indexicals  should be 
accounted for in terms of pragmatic transfer. For him, it is the lexical meaning of the indexical 
which takes us all the way to the referent, via the index. Thus, he takes the meanings of indexicals 
to be
composite functions that take us from an element of the context [the index] to an element 
[the referent] of a contextually restricted domain, then drop away. (§2.5)
In other words, the meanings of indexicals are functions from indices to referents. This means that 
the process by which we are lead from Jesse James to the property of being a condemned prisoner is 
mainly a semantic process on Nunberg's view.
3.2 Asymmetry
Nunberg accepts that there is an asymmetry between referential terms such as indexicals and non-
referential  terms  such as  descriptions.  Since descriptions  can be used  referentially just  like,  as 
Nunberg's examples show, indexicals can be used descriptively, the asymmetry cannot lie at the 
level of the range of interpretations.1 Rather, what is at stake is exactly the question we pinpointed 
regarding how the descriptive interpretation of indexical utterances are generated. On Nunberg's 
view,
indexicals can have roughly the same range of interpretations that  descriptions can:  the 
utterances that contain them can express singular or general propositions, as the case may 
be. What makes indexicals exceptional is the manner in which their interpretation arises. A 
description characterizes its interpretations; an indexical provides an object [i.e. the index] 
that corresponds to it. (§2.5)
For  Nunberg,  then,  the  interpretation  of  the  prisoner's  utterance,  i.e.  the  general  proposition 
involving the property of being a condemned prisoner, arises out of two factors. One is the meaning 
of the pronoun, which first gives us the index, i.e. Jesse James. This object is now the object that 
1 1Donnellan (1966) famously showed that definite descriptions have both attributive and
referential uses.
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“corresponds to" the thing which ultimately goes into the interpreted content. But how exactly does 
that process work?
As Nunberg notes, a natural response would perhaps be to say that the property contributed 
by the indexical in the prisoner's utterance comes from the index, i.e. Jesse James. So, we would 
take one of Jesse James salient properties, i.e. of being a condemned prisoner, and let that go into 
the interpreted content. However, Nunberg argues that this will not cover the broad range of non-
referential uses of indexicals. We do not have to go into the details of this. The important thing is 
that Nunberg concludes that
most  of  the  work  of  specifying  the  interpretation  is  accomplished  in  the  contextual 
background, rather than by the utterance, in a process mediated by speaker's intentions, the 
linguistic  context,  considerations  of  relevance  and  so  on.  Taken  together,  these  factors 
define a domain of possible referents, along several dimensions. (§2.3)
With respect to our favourite example, it is easy to see why this appeal to broad contextual 
factors is needed. Even if we agree that the meaning of I can take us all the way to a referent which 
is distinct from the index, it is implausible that for any case, the lexical meaning will pick out the 
particular referent that an interpreter must hit upon to achieve understanding in that case. It is no 
part of the meaning of the pronoun which deters us from selecting as referent say the property of 
being  a  male  individual  whose  first  name  starts  with  a  J.  It  is  because  we  share  some  vital 
information with the speaker, e.g. that he is a condemned prisoner.
This  is  the  reason  that,  as  we  saw,  Nunberg  holds  that  the  meanings  of  indexicals  are 
functions from indices to contextually constrained domains. Yet, this also means that the process by 
which we arrive at the interpretation involving the property is not a  purely semantic process, on 
Nunberg's  view.  This  prompts  the  question  of  why,  in  that  case,  Nunberg  still  thinks  that  the 
Recanati type view is wrong. As indicated above, one reason is that he thinks that in cases like the 
prisoner case, the putative literal content would be incoherent. The central point of this is that if this 
is correct, then the process by which we arrive at the general interpretation is, contrary to Recanati's 
claim, not optional.
I  will  first  examine  in  detail  Nunberg's  arguments  for  taking  the  process  of  deferred 
interpretation  to  be  non-pragmatic.  I  shall  then  return,  in  the  conclusion,  to  the  point  about 
optionality.
4 Are deferred Readings arrived at by Pragmatic Processes?
Nunberg has two main arguments for denying an account of the index-referent divergence involved 
in  cases  like  the  condemned  prisoner's  utterance  (2)  in  terms  of  pragmatic  transfer.  The  first 
argument  attempts  to  establish  that  the  putative  literal  level  of  interpretation  might  involve 
incoherent contents. The second argues that there is a significant difference between the processes 
of deferred interpretation in cases like (2) and ordinary processes of pragmatic transfer.
4.1 First Argument: Incoherence of Literal Content?
The first argument is expressed in the following passage:
sentences containing descriptive uses of indexicals may be incoherent if the indexicals are 
interpreted as making singular reference. [...] In context, the adverbs  usually and  always 
[and traditionally] must be understood as involving quantification over instances, but these 
readings are not  possible if  the subjects of the sentences are interpreted as referring to 
individuals or particular times. So it is hard to see what coherent “literal" interpretations we 
could assign to these utterances. (§4)
We normally have no problem with using referential terms referentially in environments that are 
controlled by these adverbs.  We can say things like “Nunberg usually makes good points" etc. 
Rather, the thought is that reading I in (2) as contributing Jesse James to the interpretation conflicts 
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with what is contributed by the adverb, which is analysed as a quantifier. On the contrary, I will 
argue that there is no such conflict.
Suppose we read I in the prisoner case as referring to Jesse James. That reading is 
represented by (3).
(3) Jesse James is traditionally allowed to order whatever he wants for his last meal.
One influential proposal for treating adverbs such as usually and traditionally as quantifiers is given 
by Lewis (1975). On the view Lewis opts for, the adverbs in question are regarded as quantifiers 
over what he calls `cases', where a case is a tuple of participants which provide values for the free 
variables in the sentence embedded under the quantifier. Lewis also presents persuasive arguments 
that the adverbs cannot be taken to be quantifiers over moments of time. So, charity compels us to 
not read Nunberg's “instances" in this way. Lewis' apparatus of cases therefore seems congenial to 
Nunberg's thought.
A case is an admissible assignment of values to the free variables that are used to represent the 
participants in the cases. As a device for restricting which assignments, or cases, are admissible, we 
can  adopt  Lewis'  idea  of  using  if-constructions.  Following Lewis'  recipe,  then,  we analyse  (3) 
roughly as follows:
(4) Traditionally, if x is Jesse James and x is a condemned prisoner, x is allowed to order 
whatever x wants for x's last meal.
We  would  then  regard  traditionally as  an  unselective  quantifier,  the  resulting  truth  conditions 
requiring the embedded sentence in (4) to be true in most admissible cases/assignments, i.e. those 
that satisfy the if-clause.
This means that we are analysing traditionally like we would usually, i.e. as inducing truth 
conditions in terms of most cases. To be sure, it might be argued that traditionally has features that 
usually does not, but I ignore these complications, since they arise as artefacts of the case at hand. 
The example serves the same purpose if formulated with another adverb, as Nunberg's other cases 
clearly suggest. Similarly, if it is found that  traditionally should work more like  always, then the 
same point applies that this adverb is likewise one used by Nunberg to construct examples about 
which the claim about the incoherence of the singular reading is put forth.2
It might be questioned why we are allowed the specification in the if-clause that  x be a 
condemned prisoner. The thought might be that, since this must be drawn from the extralinguistic 
context, we have abandoned Nunberg's semantic project. However, this problem is also a problem 
for Nunberg. As we saw above, he allows that the context does a lot of work in preparing the work 
for the lexical meaning to pick out the referent, via the index. So, we may take it that (4) is a 
plausible candidate analysis of the singular reading of the original utterance in (2).
In other words, we are now analysing (3) as meaning something like that in most cases 
where Jesse James is a condemned prisoner he is allowed to order whatever he wants for his last 
meal. Nunberg's claim about incoherence then seems to be motivated by the thought that one cannot 
order one's last meal more than once. I now want to make two related points regarding Nunberg's
first argument.
1. The singular reading does not lead to incoherence. It is clear that if (4) is the right analysis of (3) 
and its truth conditions are as suggested above, then the reading of the original (2) on which  I 
makes singular reference is certainly not incoherent. Indeed, (3) is not even intuitively incoherent. 
One way of bringing this out is to notice that by adjusting the setting, we can construct a context of
utterance such that there is a strong intuition that (3) is true relative to that context.
2 Cf. for instance Nunberg's example, “Tomorrow is always the biggest party night of the year." (§4)
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For instance, imagine a world in which there is no tradition that condemned prisoners have a 
privileged last meal. In this world Jesse James is a notorious criminal who has been sentenced to 
death a large number of times. However, each time he has been standing at the gallows with the 
noose around his neck, he has been pardoned at the last moment. Over the years, a tradition has 
evolved by which Jesse James is allowed to order whatever he wants for the meal he has on the 
night before he walks to the gallows. Our intuition is clear that, in such a world, an utterance of (3) 
is  true.  Indeed,  it  seems  that,  in  such  a  world,  the  most  natural  interpretation  of  the  original 
utterance in (2) is one on which I makes singular reference to Jesse James. (We return to this last 
point below.)
This shows that, whatever we might think of it, the singular reading of (2) is not incoherent, 
as Nunberg claims.
2.  Truth value intuitions about the singular readings vary depending on the context of utterance. 
Parallel to the above, we are likewise able to construct situations relative to which we get the clear 
intuition that (3) is  false.  Just  take a  world where there is  no tradition about  the last  meals of 
prisoners at all.
In other words, it seems that our intuitions about the truth value of (3) vary depending on 
which world we are evaluating at. This shows that (3) has intuitively clear truth conditions, and as I 
have suggested one proposal for analysing them is the one above using Lewis' treatment of adverbs 
of quantification.
This does not alter the fact, of course, that our intuitions regarding the status of (3) in our 
own world are clouded by the fact that, barring fantastic escapes etc., one does not get to order one's 
last meal more than once. Why is this?
I think the reason is very similar to the reason that our intuitions about case like (5) seem 
unclear.
(5) Uttered about a room which contains one single book which is black: Most books in the 
room are black.
In standard treatments of generalised quantifiers,  most receives a clause of the following rough 
approximation (where F is the set of Fs and G is the set of Gs):3 
(6) `Most Fs are Gs' is true iff |F ∩ G| > |F – G|.
On this analysis, then, (5) is true iff the set of things in the room which are both books and black is 
larger than the set of things in the room which are books but are not black. Consequently, on this 
analysis, (5) comes out true. This analysis corresponds to the intuition that 'strictly speaking' most 
means more than half.
Nevertheless, ordinary speakers are likely react to the utterance in (5) with puzzlement. Yet, 
it is not unlikely that they could relatively quickly be brought to agree that the utterance is in fact 
true,  although  inappropriate.  One  way  of  seeing  this  is  by  comparing  the  utterance  with  the 
corresponding one using all, as in (7).
(7) Uttered about a room which contains one single book which is black: All books in the room 
are black.
We have no hesitation in judging the utterance in (7) true. Furthermore, 'All Fs are Gs' entails 'Most 
Fs are Gs'.4 Realising this, along with the recognition of the truth of (7), should lead us to accept the 
3 See for instance Larson & Segal (1995, ch. 8).
4 It might be observed that if, as is standard, `All Fs are Gs' expresses the subset relation between the Fs and the Gs, i.e. F ⊆ G, then for the 
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truth of (5).
The sense of infelicity we get from (5) is thus best explained as arising from the fact that it 
is, as we put it above, true but inappropriate; that is, it is hard to see what anyone could intend to 
communicate with such an utterance, although literally true.
This suggests that there is a persuasive case to be made that the utterance in (3) shares the 
same feature of being true but inappropriate, given that traditionally is analysed as a quantifier the 
truth conditions of which parallel those of  most. In other words, in a world like our own where 
prisoners  do not  get  to  order  their  last  meals  more  than  once,  the  utterance  in  (3)  is  true  but 
inappropriate. It is true because the number of cases in which Jesse James as a condemned prisoner 
did get to order whatever he wanted for his last meal, namely 1, is larger than the cases in which he 
did not, namely 0. But it is nevertheless infelicitous, since it is hard to see what anyone could want 
to communicate by uttering it.
To sum up, Nunberg's first argument against the view that the general reading of  I in the 
prisoner's  utterance  (2)  is  generated  by  pragmatic  transfer  fails.  The  singular  reading  is  not 
incoherent. As we saw, it has intuitively clear truth conditions although bringing them out requires 
some reflection. With respect to our own world, the utterance is true, although conversationally 
peculiar.
Furthermore, we might ask ourselves why, even if it were incoherent, that would show that 
the general reading cannot arise out of a process of implicature or a similar mechanism of pragmatic 
transfer. Indeed, it seems most likely that strong reasons could be given that such cases where what 
is (literally) said is incoherent – as for instance an utterance of `John is both a lawyer and not a 
lawyer' – generate implicatures in predictable ways.
4.2 Second Argument: Indifference of Expression Choice?
Nunberg's second argument for rejecting that the readings in question are generated from pragmatic 
transfer is expressed in the following passage:
such a process would be expected to be indifferent as to whether the initial reference to the 
index was accomplished via indexical reference or the use of a proper name or referentially 
used description. These disparities could only be accounted for by postulating a semantic 
apparatus of some sort, which is to say that there must be a semantic provision for deferred 
interpretation. (§4)
This argument strikes me as stronger than the first one. Still, it will be fruitful to examine it in some 
detail before concluding anything from it.
Let us compare two scenarios. The first is the original one where Jesse James utters (2) 
using I. In the second scenario, a bystander utters the alternative (3). (Both repeated here.)
(2) Uttered by a condemned prisoner: I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I want for 
my last meal.
(3) Jesse James is traditionally allowed to order whatever he wants for his last meal.
Although the passage quoted above is somewhat condensed, I believe it would be most charitable to 
read it as presenting the following argument about the difference between these two utterances: If 
the  process  which  takes  us  from  I in  (2)  to  the  property of  being  a  condemned prisoner  is  a 
pragmatic process, then it should be possible to move from Jesse James in (3) to the property of 
being a condemned prisoner  by the same kind of process. Since this is not possible, the process 
involved in (2) is not pragmatic but semantic.
I believe that it is possible to use (3) to communicate the general content. As we did earlier, 
entailment to be validated the clause in (6) must be amended so as to allow for the case in which F = Ø. So, the right-hand side of the biconditional in 
(6) should read '|F ∩ G| > |F – G| or F = Ø '. I ignore this complication on the grounds that the entailment I am appealing to is merely an intuitive one.  
It is unquestionable that such an entailment holds in all the cases where F ≠ Ø.
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we can test our intuitions by varying the context of utterance.
Suppose we are in a world where there is only one condemned prisoner, namely Jesse James, 
and no one else has ever been condemned to death. Further, after James was given his sentence, 
capital punishment was abolished. So, James is the only prisoner that ever has been, is or will be 
condemned to death. Finally, James has been scheduled to receive his punishment several times, but 
each time the carrying out of the sentence has been held up by unexpected mishaps. Now imagine 
the following dialogue taking place in this world:
A: Is a condemned prisoner allowed to order whatever he wants for his last meal?
B: Jesse James is allowed to order whatever he wants for his last meal.
Given this stage-setting, we get a strong intuition that B's utterance communicates the content that a 
condemned prisoner is allowed to order whatever he wants for his last meal. What B is trading on is 
James'  property of being a condemned prisoner.  And she can do this  in answer to A's question 
because, in this case, James is the only one who has that property.
Now, whether this proves Nunberg's claim about the difference between the two utterances 
wrong depends on to what extent we can assimilate the process of transfer involved in B's utterance 
to the one which is involved in the original case, i.e. (2).
Above  (4.1)  I  argued  that  the  singular  reading  of  (2)  is  coherent  and  has  firm  truth 
conditions. It  is attractive to think that the way in which the general content about condemned 
prisoners is generated is very similar to the way it is generated from B's utterance. What difference 
is there between the two cases, other than the fact that the ease by which we move to the deferred 
content depends on the contextual backdrop?
In other  words,  it  seems that  the process  by which we arrive at  the deferred content  is 
indifferent to the choice between an indexical or a proper name, contrary to what Nunberg claims.
5 Concluding Remarks
The  upshot  of  the  above  is  that  Nunberg  has  failed  to  establish  that  the  deferred,  descriptive 
interpretations  of  indexicals  are  generated  by  processes  which  are  significantly  different  from 
familiar processes of pragmatic transfer, such as the one which takes the interpreter to the general 
proposition in the case of B's utterance of (3) using the proper name Jesse James. Thus, it seems 
that there is still room for a position like Recanati's.
As described earlier, the central point of Recanati's view is that the deferred interpretations 
are generated by pragmatic processes which are distinguished by their optionality. Since, as we saw, 
the singular reading of the indexical utterance in (2) is not incoherent, as Nunberg argued, it seems 
that the process by which interpreters arrive at the general content involving the property of being a 
condemned  prisoner  is  indeed  optional.  That  is,  whether  the  process  kicks  in  depends  on  the 
contextual background involving, among other things, the speaker's communicative intentions. The 
same point clearly applies to the general interpretation of (3) containing a proper name.
Recall that we said that intuitively there are two different notions of utterance understanding, 
i.e. of interpreting utterances successfully. On one of them, a hearer has interpreted the utterance 
correctly when she arrives at its literal content, what is said. On the other, understanding requires 
hitting upon the content the speaker intended to communicate with the utterance.
I believe that a lot of the appeal of a view like Nunberg's comes from our sense that a hearer 
who does not  move to  the deferred,  general  interpretation of (2) is  intuitively guilty of having 
misunderstood the utterance in the second sense, whereas she might be said to have understood the 
utterance in the first  sense.  This is parallel  to the case where Prof. X simply takes the student 
reference to mean that the student in question is punctual and has excellent handwriting. In these 
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scenarios, there is a sense in which the further process of deferred interpretation is not optional, i.e. 
it must be undertaken in order to achieve understanding in the sense of interpreting correctly what 
the speaker intended to communicate.
But it might be questioned why we need the notion of understanding the literal content at all. 
In cases where the literal content and the intended content diverge, there is a strong intuitive pull 
towards not attributing understanding unless the intended content is arrived at. In the cases where 
the literal content and the intended content coincide, understanding could then be explained by the 
same notion of understanding the speaker's intended content.
However,  it  seems that  there  are  cases  where  we particularly need  the  notion  of  literal 
understanding. One way of seeing this is to imagine a scenario in which the hearer has no way of 
accessing what the speaker might have intended with the utterances. For instance, imagine that the 
hearer of (2) only possesses the information that the speaker is Jesse James, but knows nothing 
about James' doings or the traditions pertaining to condemned prisoners. In such a scenario, the 
singular, non-deferred, interpretation of the utterance is the most reasonable one for the hearer to 
opt for. And significantly, it would be wrong to say that in such a scenario the hearer has failed to 
understand the utterance; it is just that she did not have all the information required to realise that 
the speaker had a different communicative intention.
Consequently,  it  seems  that  the  Gricean  premonition  that  our  theory  of  utterance 
interpretation will need both notions of what it is to interpret an utterance correctly is reinforced.
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Who Has My Thoughts?
Michael Hicks, Virginia Commonwealth University
The too many minds problem can be adapted to attack nearly every account of personal identity. 
The problem can be phrased loosely as a question: why do certain things count as people and others 
not? For example, if this human organism is a person, why isn't this brain also a person? It seems to 
be thinking; but I (the organism) insist that I am the person, and the brain is just a part of me. The 
problem also arises as an objection to "perdurantist" theories that maintain that persons persist by 
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